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NOTES
Mental Retardation as a Bar to the Death
Penalty: Who Bears the Burden of Proof?
State v. Johnson'
I. INTRODUCTION
In February of 1994, Ernest Lee Johnson walked into a convenience
store in Columbia, Missouri, in the middle of the night.2 He was a frequent
customer of this particular convenience store and had patronized it four times
earlier that day.3 During his fourth visit, the cashier noticed Johnson was
staring at her while she deposited money into the store safe.4 In his final visit
to the store, he murdered the employees working that evening with a hammer
and took less than $500.5 Johnson was found guilty of first-degree murder
and was sentenced to die for the murder of each of his three victims.
Over the next ten years, Johnson, whom the media dubbed the "claw
hammer killer,"' appealed his conviction and his death sentences multiple
times.8 In the midst of Johnson's ongoing legal struggle for survival in Mis-
souri, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Atkins v. Virginia that
the imposition of a death sentence for a mentally retarded offender is uncons-
1. 244 S.W.3d 144 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
2. State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
3. Id.
4. Id. The cashier was working a day shift and left work at 5:00 p.m. Id.
5. Id. at 689-90. Johnson visited the store sometime before 11:45 p.m.; he
returned to his house around 11:45 p.m. splattered in blood. Id. at 689.
6. Id. at 689.
7. Christine Lesicko, UPDATE: Johnson Defense Alleges Ineffectiveness of
Counsel, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN, July 2, 2009, available at http://www.columbia
missourian.com/stories/2009/07/02/update-defense-alleges-inefectiveness-counsel.
8. State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). In Johnson's
first appeal in 1998, he successfully had his death sentences set aside and the case
remanded for a new penalty phase hearing due to ineffective assistance of counsel;
Johnson's counsel failed to call an expert witness to testify at the penalty phase. State
v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 686, 702 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). In Johnson's second appeal
in 2000, the court rejected all of Johnson's arguments and affirmed the death penal-
ties. State v. Johnson, 22 S.W.3d 183, 194 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
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titutional. The Atkins opinion opened a new avenue for Johnson, and on
appeal his death sentences were set aside.'0 On remand, Johnson argued that
he was mentally retarded." The jury, in what was Johnson's third penalty
phase, found that Johnson was not mentally retarded and sentenced him to
die. 12 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, the court held that the
penalty phase court did not err in placing the burden of proof upon Johnson to
prove that he was mentally retarded. 3
In holding that the execution of mentally retarded offenders is cruel and
unusual punishment,' 4 the instant court followed the current trend of other
states. Even before the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its deci-
sion in Atkins, state legislatures around the country, including the Missouri
legislature, had enacted laws prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded
offenders.' 5 Also, the Supreme Court of Missouri's holding that a defendant
bears the burden of proving his mental retardation is consistent with the posi-
tion taken by the vast majority of states. However, the court rendered its
holding in the absence of any legislation placing the burden upon the defen-
dant.' 7 In so doing, the court was not acting in conformity with Missouri
common law setting forth doctrines of statutory construction.'8 Furthermore,
by not requiring that the burden of proving mental retardation be "beyond a
reasonable doubt," the court arguably failed to follow precedent of the Su-
preme Court of the United States. This Note analyzes these issues and con-
9. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). The Court held that executing mentally retarded
criminals is excessive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id This author
recognizes that the term "mentally retarded" is abrasive and offensive to some and is
merely borrowing the language and terminology of the courts. If this term offends
any readers, please know that it was not my intention.
10. State v. Johnson, 102 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). This was
Johnson's third appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri. Id. at 537.
11. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 149.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 151.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.").
15. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4(1) (2000) (enacted 1983) ("The trier
shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for
probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor . .. [i]f the trier finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded . . . ."); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (1998) (enacted 1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.150,
532.135, 532.140 (West 2006) (enacted 1990); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202
(West 2002) (portions of former Art. 27, § 412, which placed limitations on death
sentences, were repealed and replaced with this statute in 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-203(b) (West 2002) (enacted 1990).
16. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part Ill.C.
19. See infra Part Ill.A.
538 (Vol. 75
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cludes that, while the Supreme Court of Missouri's holding in the instant
decision followed the trend of other state legislatures, it failed to make its
decision in accordance with Missouri common law.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Ernest Lee Johnson is a veteran of Missouri's appellate system, having
been before the Supreme Court of Missouri four times.2o Johnson was con-
victed of three counts of first-degree murder in Boone County, Missouri, on
May 18, 1995.21 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that in February
of 1994 Johnson bludgeoned to death three employees of a Columbia conven-
22ience store using a hammer, a screwdriver, and a gun. The prosecution also
established that Johnson had been planning to hold up this particular conveni-
ence store for weeks2 and that Johnson's girlfriend's son helped Johnson by
hiding evidence.24
In the subsequent penalty phase, the jury recommended the death penal-
ty for each of the three convictions.25 In accordance with the recommenda-
tion of the jury, the trial court sentenced Johnson to death.26 Johnson filed a
motion for post-conviction relief,27 which the trial court overruled after an
20. See State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
21. Appellant's Brief at 1, State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1998) (No.
78282), 1997 WL 33813040.
22. State v. Johnson (Johnson 1), 968 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
Each victim died from head injuries "consistent with a bloody hammer found at the
scene." Id. In addition to the hammer injuries, one employee had stab wounds con-
sistent with a screwdriver found near the store, while another employee had a nonfatal
gunshot wound. Id.
23. Id at 689. In January, Johnson had told his girlfriend's eighteen-year-old
son that he was planning to hold up that convenience store. Id. Additionally, Johnson
purchased crack from the eighteen-year-old son and borrowed a handgun from the
eighteen year old. Id.
24. Id. at 689-90. Johnson's girlfriend's sixteen-year-old son had hidden the
handgun used to shoot the employee and the clothes Johnson wore during the crime in
a park. Id. at 690. The clothes Johnson had worn during the crime were splattered
with blood consistent with the blood of the victims. Id.
25. Id. at 689.
26. Id.
27. Id. See Mo. R. CRIM. PRO. 29.15, which reads,
A person convicted of a felony after trial claiming that the conviction or
sentence imposed violates the constitution and laws of this state or the
constitution of the United States, including claims of ineffective assistance
of trial and appellate counsel, that the court imposing the sentence was
without jurisdiction to do so, or that the sentence imposed was in excess
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evidentiary hearing. 28 Johnson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri for the first time. 29 The court rejected the majority of Johnson's ap-
peals30 and affirmed the conviction on all three counts.31 However, the court
found that Johnson's counsel, during the penalty phase, failed to exercise the
skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise in
similar circumstances32 by failing to call an expert witness to testify during
the penalty phase whose testimony might have provided mitigating evidence
33
of Johnson's mental health and his mental state at the time of the crime.
Further, the court found that Johnson was prejudiced by the absence of this
expert's testimony.34 Based on these conclusions, the court found that John-
son had received ineffective assistance of counsel35 and remanded the case
for a new penalty phase proceeding. 36
28. Johnson 1, 968 S.W.2d at 689.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 690-91. Johnson's first point on appeal was that the trial court erred in
allowing the State to question potential jurors during voir dire about State witnesses
who testify in accordance with a plea agreement. Id. The court held that the trial
court did not err because the witnesses offered eyewitness testimony concerning the
crime, making it so that the State had the right to discern any possible prejudice, and
because the plea agreements were not used as substantive evidence of guilt during the
trial. Id. at 692. The court next rejected Johnson's argument that his voir dire exami-
nation was improperly limited. Id. at 692-94. Johnson's second point on appeal was
that the trial court improperly granted the State's challenge for cause for five potential
jurors who indicated that they were hesitant or uncomfortable with giving the death
penalty. Id. at 692-94. The court affirmed such removal for cause. Id. at 695-96.
Johnson's final point on appeal was that his counsel during the guilt phase was inef-
fective. Id. at 695-96. The court held that Johnson's counsel was not ineffective and
affirmed the convictions on all three counts. Id at 696-97.
31. Id. at 689.
32. Id. at 699.
33. Id at 697. The expert witness reviewed the police reports, conducted a two-
and-a-half hour interview with Johnson, and concluded that at the time of the crime
Johnson suffered from "cocaine intoxication," a mental disorder caused by excessive
cocaine use. Id at 697-98. Johnson's counsel testified during the post-conviction
relief hearing that she intended to call the expert witness but that "communications
problems" and scheduling conflicts prevented her from calling the witness. Id at 698.
Johnson's counsel testified at the motion hearing that she should have asked for a
continuance or a recess. Id.
34. Id. at 702. The court stated that, while it "does not presume to know the
precise effect [the expert]'s testimony would have had on the jurors," it believed that
the expert's testimony "would have altered the jurors' deliberations to the extent that
a reasonable probability exists that they would have unanimously recommended life
imprisonment without eligibility of probation or parole." Id.
35. Id at 699.
36. Id. at 702.
540 [Vol. 75
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In the second penalty phase, the new jury also returned three death sen-
tences. 37 In 2000, on his second appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, the
court rejected all of Johnson's arguments3 and affirmed the death sentence. 39
This decision seemingly foreclosed all avenues of appeal for Johnson in Mis-
souri. In 2001, while Johnson was awaiting execution, the Missouri General
Assembly adopted an amendment to Missouri Revised Statute section
565.030, which prescribes trial procedure for first-degree murder.40 Accord-
ing to amended section 565.030, the trier of fact during the penalty phase of a
first-degree murder trial shall render a verdict of life imprisonment rather
than the death penalty if the trier finds by a preponderance of evidence that
the defendant is mentally retarded.4 1 Yet these provisions affected only of-
37. State v. Johnson (Johnson II), 22 S.W.3d 183, 185 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
Tried before a new jury, this and all subsequent penalty phases dealt only with the
issue of whether Johnson should receive the death penalty; whether Johnson commit-
ted the murders was no longer at issue. See id
38. See id. at 187. The court held that the penalty phase court did not abuse its
discretion in striking a juror for cause because the juror had misgivings about signing
his name to the death verdict form. Id at 188-89. The court held that the penalty
phase court did not abuse its discretion in striking for cause a juror who indicated that
he would hold the State to a higher burden of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 189. Johnson was barred from arguing that the State's method of execution was
unconstitutional because the original trial court judge overruled his motion relating to
that issue, and Johnson did not appeal that ruling in his original appeal. Id. at 189-90.
Johnson was barred from arguing that the jury in the penalty phase should not have
heard his statements given to the police because he was arrested without a warrant
because he did not raise this issue in his first appeal. Id. at 190. The trial court did
not err in allowing the prosecutor to put forth victim impact evidence. Id. at 190. The
trial court did not err in refusing Johnson's request for a mistrial because the prosecu-
tor's rebuttal closing argument was based upon personal opinion and belief. Id. at
191. The trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's proffered jury instructions,
which included non-statutory mitigating circumstances. Id at 191-92. The court
rejected Johnson's argument that the aggravating circumstances in the jury instruc-
tions were unconstitutional. Id at 192. The court found that the death sentences were
not imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice and that the evidence sup-
ported each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
39. Id. at 194.
40. 2001 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 267 (West). The amendment added language
removing mentally retarded offenders from consideration for the death penalty. Id.;
see infra note 41. All references to a statute are to Missouri Revised Statutes, unless
indicated otherwise.
41. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.030.4(1) (2000) ("The trier [of fact] shall assess and
declare the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole,
or release except by act of the governor . .. [i]f the trier of fact finds by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded .... .").
2010] 541
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fenses committed on or after August 28, 2001,42 and thus did not apply to
Johnson.43
Yet, in 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Atkins v.
Virginia that, because the execution of a mentally retarded criminal does not
measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purposes of the death
penalty, executing a mentally retarded criminal is excessive punishment and
unconstitutional." Therefore, the Constitution restricts a state's power to
execute a mentally retarded criminal. 45 After this decision, Johnson once
46
again appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
Before the court for a third time, Johnson argued that his counsel was
deficient in failing to present evidence of mental retardation during the
second penalty phase and that the sentence was excessive under the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 47 In light of the recent Atkins
decision prohibiting states from executing mentally retarded offenders, the
court held that a defendant who is able to prove by a preponderance of evi-
dence that he or she is mentally retarded shall not be subject to the death pe-
nalty. The court further held that, although evidence establishing Johnson's
mental retardation was available, 49 Johnson's counsel did not sufficiently
present such evidence.5 Therefore, Johnson was entitled to a new penalty
phase hearing.
In his third penalty phase hearing, Johnson presented evidence that he
52
was mentally retarded. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders IV, a person with an IQ of 70 or below is mentally re-
tarded, but it is also possible for an individual with an IQ between 70 and 75
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.7.
43. State v. Johnson (Johnson III), 102 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Mo. 2003) (en bane)
(Johnson committed his offenses in 1994.).
44. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); see U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII
("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.").
45. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
46. Johnson II, 102 S.W.3d at 537.
4 7. Id.
48. Id. at 540. The court used the "preponderance of the evidence" standard
because that is the standard given by section 565.030.4(1). See supra note 41.
49. Johnson III, 102 S.W.3d at 538-39. Johnson was evaluated by three mental
health experts prior to the trial; one expert concluded Johnson was borderline mental-
ly retarded based on his IQ scores and his history of deficient adaptive skills; another
expert determined that Johnson was brain damaged due to two childhood head inju-
ries and drug use; and the final expert testified that the findings of the two other ex-
perts were feasible. Id.
50. Id. at 538. Only two experts testified during the trial, and the expert who
concluded that Johnson was borderline mentally retarded did not testify. Id.
51. Id. at 541.
52. State v. Johnson (Johnson IV), 244 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
542 [Vol. 75
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss2/8
RETARDATION WHO BEARS THE BURDEN?
to be mentally retarded. Johnson showed that he had taken IQ tests
throughout his life and earned scores of 77, 63, 95, 78, and 84.5 After the
case was remanded for a third penalty phase hearing, Johnson was again
tested and received a full-scale IQ score of 67 . The expert witness for the
state testified that he thought Johnson was faking his low IQ.56 Johnson's
experts testified that Johnson had deficiencies in many categories of adaptive
behavior, 57 such as communication, home living, social skills, functional aca-
demics, self-direction, health and safety, and leisure and work.58 The state
offered testimony from several other witnesses that Johnson was able to
communicate well with others, and the jury was shown the interview between
the state's expert and Johnson.59 The state also offered testimony that John-
son was capable of getting a job and that it was his lack of motivation that
kept him unemployed.60 In addition, one of Johnson's experts was not quali-
fied to diagnose mental diseases, and the only defect he was qualified to di-
agnose was mental retardation.6' This same expert testified that he made
about half of his income by serving as an expert witness and testifying that a
defendant is mentally retarded and that he had never testified on behalf of the
prosecution.62 This expert also relied upon anecdotal evidence provided by
63Johnson's family to test Johnson's adaptive behaviors.
In this third penalty phase, the jury found that Johnson was not mentally
retarded and once again rendered a verdict of the death penalty for each count
of murder.6 For a fourth time, Johnson appealed to the Supreme Court of
Missouri to challenge the imposition of the death penalty.6 5
53. Id. at 153 (quoting the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
IV, the standard classification of mental disorders used by mental health professionals
in the United States).
54. Id. at 152.
55. Id. Johnson was tested by both his own expert and the expert for the state
and received a full-scale score of 67 on both tests. Id.
56. Id. at 152-53.
57. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.6 (2000) (defining mental retardation as "a condi-
tion involving substantial limitations in general functioning characterized by signifi-
cantly subaverage intellectual functioning with continual extensive related deficits
and limitations in two or more adaptive behaviors such as communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional
academics, leisure and work, which conditions are manifested and documented before
eighteen years of age").
58. Johnson IV, 244 S.W.3d at 153.
59. Id.
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As in his prior appearances before the court, Johnson raised a number of
points on appeal, each of which the court disposed of relatively quickly. 66In
addition to these points on appeal, Johnson also made several challenges deal-
ing with the issue of his alleged mental retardation. First, Johnson argued
that "the trial court erred in instructing the jury that he had the burden of
67[proof]" to show that he was mentally retarded. Johnson alleged that, by
putting the burden upon him, the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment
right.68 Further, Johnson asserted that the burden of proof should have been
upon the state. Second, Johnson argued that the state should have been
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not mentally retarded
before the jury could impose the death penalty, rather than only having to
satisfy the lower preponderance of evidence standard prescribed by section
565.030.4(1).70 Johnson argued that the holdings of Atkins71 and Ring v. Ari-
66. Id. at 157-58, 160, 162-65. Johnson alleged that the trial court erred in grant-
ing the State's challenges for cause as to four prospective jurors. Id. at 158-60. Each
of these four jurors gave answers during the voir dire indicating that he would have
difficulty imposing the death penalty. Id. For each of these jurors, the court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State's motion to strike for
cause. Id. at 160. Next, Johnson alleged that the trial court erred in admitting crime
scene and autopsy photographs, as they were gruesome, inflammatory, and overly
prejudicial. Id. at 161. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the photographs. Id. at 162. Johnson also challenged the jury instruc-
tions, alleging that the trial court erred in giving three different jury instructions, one
for each count of the three counts of murder. Id. The court held that there was no
evidence suggesting that the death penalties were imposed as result of passion, prej u-
dice, or any other arbitrary factor because sufficient evidence was presented by the
State to support the jury's findings of aggravating circumstances. Id. at 163. Also,
the court found that the death sentence imposed upon Johnson was neither excessive
nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Id. at 164.
67. Id. at 150.
68. Johnson IV, 244 S.W.3d at 150. The Sixth Amendment provides as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previous-
ly ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
69. Johnson IV, 244 S.W.3d at 150.
70. Id
71. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth
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zona72 supported his proposition that a jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant is not mentally retarded.73 Finally, Johnson argued
that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a directed verdict be-
cause the mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase outweighed the
aggravating evidence as a matter of law.74 The court rejected Johnson's ar-
guments, affirmed the death penalties, and held that when a defendant guilty
of first-degree murder wishes to avoid the death penalty because he is mental-
ly retarded it is the defendant's burden to prove to a jury that he is mentally
retarded.75 The court further held that a jury is not required to find beyond a
76
reasonable doubt that the defendant is mentally retarded.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Death Penalty in the United States
The death penalty has existed throughout history.77 Hammurabi's Code,
the earliest recorded body of laws, 78 provided for the death penalty for twen-
ty-five different offenses.79 For hundreds of years prior to the formation of
the United States, the death penalty existed in Britain.80 In fact, the British
made extensive use of the death penalty.8 1 For example, under the rule of
Henry VIII, who reigned over England for thirty-eight years, 72,000 people
were executed.82 One reason so many individuals were executed by the Brit-
72. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) ("If a State makes an increase in a
defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the findings of a fact, that fact - no
matter how the State labels it - must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.").
73. Johnson IV, 244 S.W.3d at 150.
74. Id. at 157.
75. Id. at 151.
76. Id.
77. Jeffrey M. Banks, Note, In re Stanford: Do Evolving Standards of Decency
Under Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Render Capital Punishment Inapposite for
Juvenile Offenders?, 48 S.D. L. REV. 327, 338 (2003).
78. Derek W. St. Pierre, Note, The Transition from Property to People: The
Road to the Recognition of Rights for Non-Human Animals, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 255, 262 (1998).
79. Michael H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, in SOCIETY'S FINAL
SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 1, 1 (Laura E. Randa
ed., 1997), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/execution/
readings/history.html.
80. Dawinder S. Sidhu, On Appeal: Reviewing the Case Against the Death Pen-
alty, 111 W.VA. L. REV. 453, 457 (2009).
81. Id. at 457-58.
82. George Lawyer, Should the Grand Jury System Be Abolished?, 15 YALE L.J.
178, 179 (1906). Henry VIII ascended the throne of England in 1509 and died in
1547. British History Online, Timeline of Henry VIII, http://british-history.ac.uk/
2010] 545
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ish is that Britain's list of capital crimes was quite lengthy: in the eighteenth
century, one could be sentenced to death for 222 crimes, including cutting
83down a tree and counterfeiting stamps.
When the British colonists arrived in America, they brought with them
British forms of justice, including the death penalty.84 Generally, the Ameri-
can colonies imposed the death sentence for the same offenses as the English.
In Massachusetts Bay Colony during the seventeenth century, a person could
be sentenced to death for pre-meditated murder, sodomy, witchcraft, adultery,
idolatry, blasphemy, assault in anger, rape, statutory rape, poisoning, and
bestiality.85 By the late eighteenth century, the number of capital crimes in
Massachusetts had been whittled down to seven: murder, sodomy, burglary,
arson, rape, and treason.86 By 1776, most of the colonies had nearly the same
death statutes, which provided for the death penalty in instances of arson,
piracy, treason, murder, sodomy, burglary, robbery, rape, horse-stealing,
slave rebellion, and often counterfeiting.
The American public has been debating the merits of the death penalty
in the United States since the founding of the nation. The first great era of
reform occurred between 1833 and 1853.8 As a result of opposition to the
death penalty, fifteen states banned public hangings.90 Interestingly, the ban-
ning of public executions was opposed by many death penalty abolitionists,
who felt as though the public executions provided firsthand evidence of the
cruelty of the death penalty.91 Abolitionists hoped more people would come
to find the death penalty abhorrent by observing the executions firsthand.92
In the second half of the nineteenth century, several states abolished the death
period.aspx?tme=8 (last visited March 16, 2010). For comparison, only 4,916 indi-
viduals were executed in the United States between the years of 1930 and 2006. Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment, 2006 Statistical Tables,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2006/tables/cpO6stO9.cfm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2010).
83. Sidhu, supra note 80, at 457-58.
84. Id at 458-59. However, the American colonies sought to limit the use of the
death penalty before the enactment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 458.
85. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 7 (1982).
86. Id
87. Id.
88. See ScoTr TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER'S REFLECTIONS ON
DEALING WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 22 (2003) ("To some extent, the debate about
capital punishment has been going on almost since the founding of the Republic.");
Sidhu, supra note 80, at 454.
89. PHILIP ENGLISH MACKEY, VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION
TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, xix-xxviii (Philip English Mackey ed., 1976).
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penalty altogether; however, some of those states reinstated the death penalty
decades later.93
A recurring argument against the death penalty is that sentencing a de-
fendant to death violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.94 However, prior to 1962 few Supreme Court cases
construing the Eighth Amendment were decided. In 1892, in O'Neil v.
Vermont, the Court reaffirmed that the Eighth Amendment was not applicable
96to the states. Years later, in Weems v. United States, a Coast Guard officer
was convicted of falsifying documents of the United States government of the
Philippine Islands97 and was sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment and
hard labor. The Court overturned his sentence, holding that the sentence
was excessive and in violation of the Constitutional prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.99 In so holding, the Court stated that the Eighth
Amendment is not forever bound to the standards of public opinion that the
drafters of the amendment possessed, but rather it is progressive and "may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane jus-
tice."'0
Another case prior to 1962 dealing with the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment was Trop v. Dulles, which was decided in 1958. oi In this case,
a private in the United States Army was found guilty of the crime of deser-
tion, was dishonorably discharged, and lost his citizenship as a result. 102The
Court reversed the convictionio3 in part on the ground that denationalization
as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment.1'4 In its opinion, the
Court found that the basic concept behind the amendment is "nothing less
than the dignity of man."' 05 Also, the Court concluded that "[t]he Amend-
ment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency" of so-
ciety.106 In dicta, the Court stated that "the death penalty has been employed
93. Id. at xxxiii-xxxiv, xl.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. VIl ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.").
95. Bethany C. Bryant, Comment, Expanding Atkins and Roper: A Diagnostic
Approach to Excluding the Death Penalty as Punishment for Schizophrenic Offend-
ers, 78 Miss. L.J. 905, 909 (2009).
96. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1892).
97. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1910).
98. Id. at 358.
99. Id. at 382.
100. Id. at 378.
101. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958).
102. Id. at 88.
103. Id. at 91.
104. Id. at 101.
105. Id. at 100.
106. Id. at 101.
2010] 547
11
Eftink: Eftink: Mental Retardation as a Bar to the Death Penalty
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot
be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty."' 0 7
In 1962, the Supreme Court decided the case of Robinson v. California,
in which the Court held that a California law that made it a crime to be a drug
addict was unconstitutional. 0 8 In so holding, the Court stated that punishing
an individual for suffering from the disease of drug addiction'" "inflicts a
cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."l0
Furthermore, comparing the California law against being a drug addict to a
hypothetical law against being mentally ill or suffering from some other so-
cially stigmatized disease, the Court concluded that such a law would be "un-
iversally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."'' Thus, the Supreme Court
first held in Robinson that the Eighth Amendment's limitation on cruel and
unusual punishment was applicable to state governments."l 2
In 1972 the Supreme Court finally had the opportunity to consider, for
the first time, whether the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 1 In Furman v. Georgia, the Court con-
sidered three consolidated state cases in which each defendant was sentenced
to die.114 The Court held that the statutes under which the defendants were
given the death penalty were unconstitutional, but the Court was unable to
agree as to a rationale, and each Justice wrote a separate opinion. 115 Accor-
dingly, the defendants' death sentences were set aside,"6 and the death penal-
ty, as it largely existed in the United States at that time, was rendered uncons-
107. Id at 99.
108. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
109. Id (counsel for the State recognized that narcotic addiction is an illness).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 666.
112. Id; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (citing Robinson, Justice Douglas claims "[t]hat the requirements of due process
ban cruel and unusual punishment is now settled").
113. Bryant, supra note 95, at 910. The Court had broached the issue of the death
penalty and the Eighth Amendment in prior cases. In Rudolph v. Alabama, in which
the majority denied certiorari, Justice Goldberg in his dissent stated he would have
granted certiorari to consider whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments bar the
imposition of the death penalty upon a convicted rapist. 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Gold-
berg, J., dissenting). Five years later, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, Justice Douglas in
his dissent raised the issue of whether the death penalty violates the Eighth Amend-
ment but also stated that the Eighth Amendment issue was not relevant in that case.
391 U.S. 510, 530 n.13 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
114. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (per curiam opinion). One of the defendants was
charged with murder; the other two were charged with rape. Id.
115. Id. at 238.
116. Id. at 240 (per curiam opinion).
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titutional.1 7 However, Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion explained
that the Court's ruling did not render capital punishment unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment; rather, the decision of the Court meant that
legislatures of state and federal governments could no longer use discretio-
nary sentencing statutes if they wished to continue to employ capital punish-
ment. i1 According to the Chief Justice, states could continue to use the
death penalty by providing stricter standards for juries and judges to follow in
determining the sentence in capital cases or by imposing a death sentence for
fewer crimes.1 19 Thus, the exact holding of Furman and its effect on the
death penalty was left unclear.
In the following years, the Court attempted to clarify its holding from
Furman. In 1976 the Court held that the death penalty does not violate the
Eighth Amendment in every circumstancel20 and clarified that discretion in
giving the death penalty is acceptable but must be "suitably directed and lim-
ited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."l21
At the other end of the discretionary spectrum, the Court held in Woodson v.
North Carolina that North Carolina's death sentence statute providing for
mandatory imposition of the death sentence for defendants convicted of first-
degree murder was unconstitutional because it did not comply with Furman's
requirement of replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective
standards.122 State legislatures listened, and by 1976 at least thirty-five states
had either revised their old death penalty statutes or enacted new ones that
comported with Furman and its progeny.123
Over the next three decades, the Court continued to limit the availability
of the death penalty for criminal offenders. In Coker v. Georgia, the Court
held that a sentence of death for an offender convicted of the rape of an adult
violates the Eighth Amendment.124 The Court based its holding largely on
117. Id. at 239-40. Justice Douglas believed that the death penalty violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan also believed that the death penalty violates the Constitution. Id. at 306
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart found it unnecessary to reach the ultimate
question of the constitutionality of the death penalty. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). Justice White did not think that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional.
Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall believed that the death penalty
does violate the Constitution. Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 398 (Burger, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 400.
120. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
121. Id. at 189. The Court further stated that "the concerns expressed in Furman
that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be
met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given
adequate information and guidance." Id. at 195.
122. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
123. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80.
124. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
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the distinction between the crime of murder and the crime of rape; while a
murder victim's life is forever extinguished, a rape victim is still alive, albeit
traumatized.125 Later, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the execution
of offenders who were less than eighteen years old at the time they committed
the crime is unconstitutional.126 Then, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court
held that it is unconstitutional to sentence an offender to die for the rape of a
child. 127
In 2002, the Court dealt with another case impacting the imposition of
the death penalty in the states.128 In Ring v. Arizona, the defendant and two
accomplices hijacked an armored car carrying nearly a million dollars and
killed the driver.129 The defendant was found guilty of felony murder.130 The
evidence admitted at trial failed to prove that the defendant was a major par-
ticipant in the armed robbery or the actual murder, but clear evidence showed
that the defendant benefitted from the proceeds of the robbery.' Under Ari-
zona law at the time, the defendant could not be sentenced to death unless a
further penalty phase hearing was held, in which the judge alone made all
factual findings without a jury,132 meaning that the judge determined the
presence or absence of aggravating circumstances and mitigating circums-
tances. In the penalty phase hearing, the defendant's accomplice, who was
unavailable to testify in the guilt phase,134 testified that the defendant planned
the robbery and killed the guard.s35 The judge entered a special verdict sen-
tencing the defendant to death, acknowledging that the defendant would only
be eligible for the death penalty if he had been the actual killer of the driv-
er.136 Citing the testimony of the accomplice, the judge found that the defen-
dant was the actual killer.' 37
125. Id at 598.
126. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
127. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008).
128. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
129. Id at 589-90.
130. Id at 591-92.
13 1. Id.
132. Id at 592.
133. Id
134. Id. at 593. Both of the defendant's accomplices were also charged with rob-
bery and murder in separate trials. Id. Between the defendant's trial and the penalty
phase hearing, one of the accomplices pled guilty to second-degree murder and armed
robbery, having testified that the defendant was the one who actually shot the driver
of the armored car. Id.
135. Id
136. Id. at 594.
137. Id
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On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the death sentence.' The
Court noted that, based upon the findings of the jury during the guilt phase,
the maximum punishment the defendant could have received was life impris-
onment for felony murder.'3 9 Thus, the question was whether the aggravating
factors triggering the death penalty properly could be found by the judge ra-
ther than by the jury.140 The Court held that, if a state makes an increase in a
defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that
fact must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.141 The Court held
that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury may not find an aggravating
factor necessary for the imposition of the death sentence and that, because
Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent
of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be
found by a jury.142 Further, the Court held that the right to a trial guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment applies to the fact-finding hearing necessary to in-
crease a defendant's sentence.143
Prior to 1989, the Court had not considered whether a mentally retarded
individual could be executed. In 1989, the Supreme Court of the United
States finally had the opportunity to consider the matter in the case of Penry
v. Lynaugh, in which the defendant was a mentally retarded individual'" who
raped and murdered a young woman in 1979.145 When the case finally
reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that, while mental retardation is a
factor that a jury may consider in determining culpability, the Eighth
Amendment does not preclude the execution of a mentally retarded offender
by the sole virtue of his or her mental retardation.146 The Supreme Court
based its holding largely on the fact that there was no clear national consen-
sus on the issue.147
In response to the Court's holding in Penry, many state legislatures
passed statutes exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty. Prior
to Penry, only two states excluded mentally retarded offenders from the death
138. Id. at 597. The Arizona Supreme Court had affirmed the death sentence, and
the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Id at 596.
139. Id. at 597.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 602 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000)).
142. Id. at 609.
143. Id.
144. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 309-10 (1989). Evidence was presented
that the defendant was mentally retarded. Id. The expert witness for the State even
testified that the defendant was mentally retarded. Id
145. Id. at 308.
146. Id. at 340.
147. Id. at 334.
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penalty.148 In the years following the Court's decision in Penry, fourteen
states, including Missouri, adopted statutes exempting mentally retarded of-
fenders from the death penalty.' 49 Additionally, the federal government ex-
cluded mentally retarded offenders from the death penalty in 1994.150
In 2002, the Supreme Court readdressed the issue of mental retardation
as a potential bar to execution under the Eighth Amendment in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia. s5 In Atkins, the defendant was found guilty of capital murder, and in
the penalty phase the expert witness for the defendant testified that the defen-
dant was mildly mentally retarded.152 The state presented evidence that the
defendant was not mentally retarded but was at least of "average intelli-
gence."'s3 In his challenge to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that a
mentally retarded offender could not be sentenced to death. 154 The Supreme
Court held that the execution of mentally retarded criminals is excessive un-
der the Eighth Amendment and that the Constitution places a substantive
restriction on the state's power to take the life of a mentally retarded offend-
er.iss
148. Georgia and Maryland already excluded mentally retarded offenders from the
death penalty. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (1998); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §
2-202 (West 2002).
149. In 1990, the Kentucky and Tennessee legislatures also enacted such statutes.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.150, 532.135, 532.140 (West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-203(b) (West 2002). In 1991, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington,
Indiana, and Kansas exempted the mentally retarded from the death penalty. N.M.
STAT. § 31-20A-2.1 (2003) (repealed 2009) (in 2009, New Mexico abolished the
death penalty, N.M. STAT. § 31-18-14 (2003 & Supp. 2009)); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-
618(b) (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-401 (2001) (repealed 2002); WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2) (1993); IND. CODE §§ 35-36-9-2 through 35-36-9-6 (2007);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(d) (2009). In 2000 and 2001, South Dakota, Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, North Carolina, and Missouri followed suit. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (2009); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753 (2009); CONN. GEN
STAT. § 53a-46a(h) (2002); FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2006); N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-2005
(2001); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
150. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2006).
151. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
152. Id. at 308.
153. Id. at 338-39. There were two penalty phase hearings. Id. at 309. In the
first, the jury sentenced the defendant to death, but the Supreme Court of Virginia
ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading
verdict form. Id. In the second penalty phase, the State presented evidence that the
defendant was not retarded but was of average intelligence, and the second jury again
sentenced the defendant to death. Id.
154. Id. at 310 (The defendant first brought his challenge in the Supreme Court of
Virginia. The majority of that court rejected the defendant's argument, based upon
the Supreme Court of the United States' holding in Penry. The Court granted certi-
orari.).
155. Id. at 321.
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In its discussion, the Court first noted that it is a "precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the of-
fense."156 The Court also noted that a claim of excessive punishment under
the Eighth Amendment is judged by currently prevailing standards and that
the Amendment must draw its meaning from the "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."15 However, the Court's
holding was principally based upon the fact that, in the years since the Penry
decision, many more state legislatures had enacted statutes banning death
sentences for mentally retarded criminals. 158 Noting that the "clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
enacted by the country's legislatures"' 59 and that enacting a statute that is
considered beneficial to criminals is unpopular for legislators, 1o the Court
reasoned that the consistent shift among state legislatures against executing
mentally retarded offenders provided powerful evidence that modem society
views mentally retarded offenders as less culpable than the average crimi-
nal. 161 Additionally, the consensus suggested that some characteristics of
mental retardation undermine the appropriateness of the death penalty.162
Namely, because mentally retarded individuals have diminished capacities,
their personal culpability is diminished,'63 and thus executing mentally re-
tarded offenders will not measurably further the goals of deterrence and retri-
bution. 64
Since the decision in Atkins, more states have passed statutes banning
the execution of mentally retarded offenders in accordance with the Court's
holding. As a general trend, most states require the defendant to prove that he
or she is mentally retarded in order to be exempt from the death penalty.
Twenty-one states have passed statutes that expressly require the defendant to
bear the burden of proving his or her own mental retardation.165 In another
156. Id. at 311 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
157. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
158. Id. at 314-15.
159. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
160. Id. at 315-16.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 317.
163. Id. at 318.
164. Id. at 321.
165. State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 150 n.3 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). These
states include Arizona (which has since abolished the death penalty), Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-753 (2009); ARK.
CODE. § 5-4-618(b) (1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1.3-1102 (2002); DEL. CODE tit. 11 § 4209 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2006); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-7-130.1 (1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A (2009); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-15 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2(b) (2007); LA. REv.
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eight states, courts have held that the defendant is required to prove mental
retardation. 66 Four states do not have any laws addressing the execution of
the mentally retarded.167 The remaining states do not allow for the imposition
of the death penalty upon any defendant under any circumstance. Three
state statutes do not express whether the defendant or the state has the burden
of proving mental retardation - including Missouri's statute.' 69
STAT. § 15:567.1 (2004); MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 28-105.01 (West 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.098 (West 2003); N.M.
STAT. § 31-20A-2.1 (2003) (repealed 2009) (In 2009, New Mexico abolished the
death penalty. N.M. STAT. § 31-18-14 (Supp. 2009)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005
(2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3 (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203
(West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-104(12)(a) (West 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2) (1993).
166. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 150 n.3. The courts of Alabama, Kentucky, Missis-
sippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas have held that the
defendant shall bear the burden of proving that he is mentally retarded. Morrow v.
State, 928 So. 2d 315, 322-23 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Bowling v. Commonwealth,
163 S.W.3d 361, 382 (Ky. 2005); Goodin v. State, 856 So. 2d 267, 276 (Miss. 2003);
State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002); Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135,
1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 211 (Pa.
2003); Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 (S.C. 2003); Exparte Briseno, 135
S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
167. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 150 n.3. Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, and
Wyoming do not have any laws addressing the burden of proving mental retardation.
Id.
168. Id. These states include Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2008);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 (2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 792.10 (repealed 2003); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 1251 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 279, § 68 (1998),
invalidated by Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.316 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-3 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. § 31-18-14 (Supp. 2009); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
400.27 (2005), invalidated by People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 120 (N.Y. 2004); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 2303 (2008), invalidated by State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55, 57 (Vt. 2005); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-2 (West 2008); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.50 (West 2005).
169. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 150 n.3. The statutes of Kansas and Connecticut do
not state which party has the burden of proving that the defendant is mentally re-
tarded. Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(d) (2009) ("If, at the conclusion of a
hearing pursuant to this section, the court determines that the defendant is mentally
retarded, the court shall sentence the defendant as otherwise provided by law, and no
sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole shall be imposed hereund-
er."); CONN. GEN STAT. § 53a-46a(h) (2002) ("The court shall not impose the sentence
of death on the defendant if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special
verdict, as provided by subsection (e), that at the time of the offense . .. the defendant
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B. The Death Penalty in Missouri
Like many other states' laws, the Supreme Court of the United States'
decision in Furman rendered Missouri's permissive death penalty statute
unconstitutional.170 In response to the holding in Furman, the Missouri Gen-
eral Assembly, along with other state legislatures, passed death sentence stat-
utes with mandatory sentencing for defined offenses.171 In State v. Duren, the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that such mandatory sentencing was uncons-
titutional under the Eighth Amendment.172 The court relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in Woodson that mandatory sentencing provides no standards
to guide the jury and no check on arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death sentence. 173 However, the court in Duren did not hold that execution is
always unconstitutional; rather, the court held that Missouri's death penalty
statute failed to comport with the Supreme Court's holding in Furman.174
The court noted that it was possible to construct a death penalty statute that
would not contravene the Supreme Court's holding in Furman.175 Thus, the
court did not close the door forever on the death penalty in Missouri.
Five years later, the Supreme Court of Missouri considered the state's
new permissive death penalty statute,176 enacted by the General Assembly in
the wake of the court's decision in Duren. In State v. Newlon, 177 the court
held that the death penalty statute was constitutionally permissible under the
Eighth Amendment. The court reasoned that, because the Missouri statute
closely mirrored Georgia's death sentence statute, which the Supreme Court
held to be constitutionally valid in Gregg,'79 the Missouri statute also was
constitutionally permissible.180 Furthermore, the court went on to hold that
the death penalty does not violate provisions of the Missouri Constitution,s'
thereby affirming that the imposition of the death penalty is constitutionally
permissible.
Under the current statutory scheme in Missouri, cases in which the de-
fendant could potentially be sentenced to death are partitioned into two sepa-
rate hearings.182 First, facts are presented to allow the fact-finder to deter-
170. State v. Duren, 547 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
171. Id. at 478.
172. Id. at 481.
173. Id. at 479-80 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04
(1976)).
174. Id. at 479-80.
175. Id. at 479.
176. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.008 (repealed 1983).
177. State v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
178. Id. at 612.
179. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
180. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d at 612.
181. Id. at 612-13.
182. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.2 (2000).
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mine whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.183 If during the
guilty phase the fact-finder finds the defendant guilty of first-degree murder,
a second stage, during which the punishment is assessed, proceeds.'" Evi-
dence of mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances is presented
by both the state and the defendant, bound by the rules of evidence.' 85 If the
fact-finder does not find at least one statutory aggravating factor, or if the
183. Id ("Where murder in the first degree is submitted to the trier without a
waiver of the death penalty, the trial shall proceed in two stages before the same trier.
At the first stage the trier shall decide only whether the defendant is guilty or not
guilty of any submitted offense. The issue of punishment shall not be submitted to
the trier at the first stage.").
184. Id § 565.030.4 ("If the trier at the first stage of a trial where the death penal-
ty was not waived finds the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, a second
stage of the trial shall proceed at which the only issue shall be the punishment to be
assessed and declared. Evidence in aggravation and mitigation of punishment ...
may be presented subject to the rules of evidence at criminal trials. Such evidence
may include, within the discretion of the court, evidence concerning the murder vic-
tim and the impact of the crime upon the family of the victim and others.").
185. Id.
186. Id. § 565.032.2
(1) The offense was committed by a person with a prior record of convic-
tion for murder in the first degree, or the offense was committed by a per-
son who has one or more serious assaultive criminal convictions; (2) The
murder in the first degree offense was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of another unlawful
homicide; (3) The offender by his act of murder in the first degree know-
ingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a
weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more
than one person; (4) The offender committed the offense of murder in the
first degree for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or
any other thing of monetary value from the victim of the murder or anoth-
er; (5) The murder in the first degree was committed against a judicial of-
ficer, former judicial officer, prosecuting attorney or former prosecuting
attorney, circuit attorney or former circuit attorney, assistant prosecuting
attorney or former assistant prosecuting attorney, assistant circuit attorney
or former assistant circuit attorney, peace officer or former peace officer,
elected official or former elected official during or because of the exercise
of his official duty; (6) The offender caused or directed another to commit
murder in the first degree or committed murder in the first degree as an
agent or employee of another person; (7) The murder in the first degree
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, or depravity of mind; (8) The murder in the first degree was com-
mitted against any peace officer, or fireman while engaged in the perfor-
mance of his official duty; (9) The murder in the first degree was commit-
ted by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace
officer or place of lawful confinement; (10) The murder in the first degree
was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing
a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or
[Vol. 75556
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fact-finder finds that the mitigating factor(s) outweighs any aggravating fac-
tor(s), then the fact-finder must assess life imprisonment rather than the death
sentence.'87  Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Atkins, the Supreme
Court of Missouri did not have the occasion to consider the constitutionality
of executing mentally retarded offenders. However, the Missouri General
Assembly passed legislation proscribing the execution of mentally retarded
offenders two years prior to the Court's decision in Atkins.'8 Under the sta-
tute, if the fact-finder determines by a preponderance of evidence that the
defendant is mentally retarded, the defendant is disqualified from the death
penalty.189 The statute does not expressly state whether the state or the de-
fendant bears the burden of proving the defendant's mental retardation or lack
thereof.
another; (11) The murder in the first degree was committed while the de-
fendant was engaged in the perpetration or was aiding or encouraging
another person to perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate a felony of any de-
gree of rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, or any felony of-
fense in chapter 195, RSMo; (12) The murdered individual was a witness
or potential witness in any past or pending investigation or past or pending
prosecution, and was killed as a result of his status as a witness or poten-
tial witness; (13) The murdered individual was an employee of an institu-
tion or facility of the department of corrections of this state or local cor-
rection agency and was killed in the course of performing his official du-
ties, or the murdered individual was an inmate of such institution or facili-
ty; (14) The murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of
an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; (15) The murder
was committed for the purpose of concealing or attempting to conceal any
felony offense defined in chapter 195, RSMo; (16) The murder was com-
mitted for the purpose of causing or attempting to cause a person to re-
frain from initiating or aiding in the prosecution of a felony offense de-
fined in chapter 195, RSMo; (17) The murder was committed during the
commission of a crime which is part of a pattern of criminal street gang
activity as defined in section 578.421.
Id.
187. Id. § 565.030.4
(2) If the trier does not find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the
statutory aggravating circumstances set out in subsection 2 of section
565.032; or (3) If the trier concludes that there is evidence in mitigation of
punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the statutory
mitigating circumstances listed in subsection 3 of section 565.032, which
is sufficient to outweigh the evidence in aggravation of punishment found
by the trier ....
Id.
188. State v. Johnson, 102 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
189. Id. § 565.030.4(1) ("The trier shall assess and declare the punishment at life
imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the
governor ... [i]f the trier finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
is mentally retarded .... .").
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C. The Rule ofLenity
The rule of lenity originated in England during the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries to protect individuals from the severity and expan-
sion of the death penalty.190 In Missouri, when interpreting criminal statutes,
the rule of lenity requires a court to strictly construe the statute against the
state.191 Also, the rule provides that, in order to protect a defendant from the
loss of his or her freedom, courts may not interpret criminal statutes "so as to
embrace persons and acts not specifically and unambiguously brought within
their terms."' 92 The rule of lenity applies both when interpreting statutes
defining crimes and when providing for sentencing.' 9 3 While the rule pro-
vides that criminal statutes must be strictly construed, the court interpreting
the statute may consider the intent of the legislature in enacting the statue,
and the court may interpret the statute in the context of common sense or
evident statutory purpose.1 94 As a corollary of the rule, if there is doubt con-
cerning the harshness of the penalty defined by a statute, the rule of lenity
195
states that the milder penalty shall be assessed rather than the harsher one.
In recent years, the rule of lenity has been applied by the Supreme Court
of Missouri to dispose of cases favorably for defendants. In J.S. v. Beaird,
the court held that a convicted sex offender was not required to register as a
sex offender in Jackson County.196 Under the state sex offender registry law,
any person convicted of a sex crime shall register with the county sheriff
within ten days of "coming into any county."' 9 7 The convicted sex offender
had lived in Jackson County for a year before the statute was passed.198 After
noting that the phrase "coming into" is subject to several different interpreta-
tions,' 99 the court held that the statute did not apply to the convicted sex of-
fender because he had resided in Jackson County since before the statute was
enacted.200 The court noted that its interpretation of the statute 201 was consis-
tent with the rule of lenity.202
190. Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the
Rule ofLenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197,200 (1994).
191. State v. Salazar, 236 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (citing State v.
Hobokin, 768 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Mo. 1989) (en banc)).
192. Id. (citing State v. Lloyd, 7 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Mo. 1928)).
193. United Pharmacal Co. of Mo., Inc. v. Mo. Bd. of Pharmacy, 208 S.W.3d 907,
913 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
194. State v. Hobokin, 768 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (citing State v.
Ballard, 294 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo. App. 1956)).
195. State v. Stewart, 832 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
196. J.S. v. Beaird, 28 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
197. Mo. REV. STAT. § 589.400.2 (2000).
198. Beaird, 28 S.W.3d at 875.
199. Id at 876.
200. Id at 877.
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In Woods v. State, a defendant, who pled guilty to stealing clothing,
challenged his enhanced penalty for prior offenses.203 Under Missouri statu-
tory law, an enhanced penalty is appropriate when the defendant has been
204
convicted of stealing on two separate occasions. At trial, the state offered
evidence of two prior convictions of stealing entered on the same date in the
same court by the same judge.205 The defendant argued that the state failed to
establish that the defendant had two prior convictions on two separate occa-
sions. 206 The court held that the enhanced penalty statute did not apply to the
defendant, reasoning that the statute is ambiguous as to whether the prior
convictions must be on separate occasions or the crimes must be committed
207
on separate occasions.207 The court stated that, under the rule of lenity, the
defendant "is entitled to the benefit of that ambiguity."208
In State v. Graham, a defendant was convicted of sodomy based upon
events that occurred nearly thirty years earlier.209 The defendant appealed the
denial of his motion for dismissal of the indictment.210 He made his motion
211to dismiss based upon the three-year statute of limitation that applied to all
felonies, except those punishable by death or a minimum of life imprison-
212
ment. The state argued that life imprisonment was a potential punishment
for the crime of sodomy because the statute213 provided no time limitation on
the sentence.214 Thus, the state argued, the three-year statute of limitation did
not apply to the defendant. 215 The court reversed the trial court's decision
201. Id. (The court adopts an interpretation that "only a person coming into a
county to establish residence must register with the sheriff.").
202. Id.
203. Woods v. State, 176 S.W.3d 711, 712 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
204. Mo. REV. STAT. § 570.040 (2000 & Supp. 2009) ("Every person who has
previously pled guilty to or been found guilty of two stealing-related offenses com-
mitted on two separate occasions where such offenses occurred within ten years of the
date of occurrence of the present offense and who subsequently pleads guilty or is
found guilty of a stealing-related offense is guilty of a class D felony. . . .").
205. Woods, 176 S.W.3d at 712. To prove the existence of the prior conviction,
the state offered "two previous guilty pleas entered on the same date, in the same
court, with the same counsel, and the same judge." Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 712-13.
208. Id. at 713.
209. State v. Graham, 204 S.W.3d 655, 656 (Mo. 2006) (en bane). The defendant
was convicted in 2002 for crimes that took place between 1975 and 1978. Id.
210. Id.
211. Mo. REv. STAT. § 541.200 (repealed 1979).
212. Graham, 204 S.W.3d at 656.
213. Mo. REV. STAT. § 541.190 (repealed 1979).
214. Graham, 204 S.W.3d at 656-57 (The statute under which the defendant was
prosecuted provided that those convicted of sodomy shall be punished by "not less
than two years.").
215. Id. at 657.
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and granted the defendant's motion for dismissal. The court stated that
section 541.190 was ambiguous.217 It held that the statute could be inter-
preted as allowing the prosecution of sodomy because the offense is poten-
tially punishable by life imprisonment218 or could be interpreted as referring
only to the most serious crimes, which specify death and life imprisonment as
punishments. 219 Citing the rule of lenity, the court held that section 541.190
applied only to the most serious offenses, for which death or life imprison-
220
ment are the two possible penalties.
Most recently, in State v. Salazar, the defendant challenged his convic-
tion for criminal nonsupport of a child.221 Under the statute, a person com-
mits the crime of nonsupport if that person fails to provide for his or her
child;222 a child includes any child "legitimated by legal process."223 Prior to
the trial, an administrative order of the department of child support enforce-
224
ment (DCSE) declared the defendant to be the child's father. In convicting
the defendant, the circuit court did not make its own determination as to
whether the defendant was the father; instead it relied upon the department of
child support enforcement's order.225 The court first noted that the phrase
226 227
"legal process" is not defined in the statute. Citing the rule of lenity, the
court went on to hold that the DCSE's order did not constitute "legal process"
under the statute and reversed the defendant's conviction.228
It should be noted that typically in instances where the criminal statute
may appear ambiguous but is in fact unambiguous, and therefore does not
trigger the rule of lenity, the court expressly takes note of such lack of ambi-
guity.229
216. Id at 658.
217. Id at 657.
218. Id. at 656 (The statute under which the defendant was prosecuted provided
that those convicted of sodomy shall be punished by "not less than two years.").
219. Id at 656-57.
220. Id. at 658.
221. State v. Salazar, 236 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
222. Mo. REV. STAT. § 568.040.1 (2000).
223. Id. § 568.040.2(1).
224. Salazar, 236 S.W.3d at 645.
225. Id. at 646.
226. Id
227. Id
228. Id. at 647.
229. See generally State v. Rowe, 63 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Mo. 2002) (en banc);
State v. Stewart, 832 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); Sours v. State, 603
S.W.2d 592, 611 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Johnson's fourth appeal before the Supreme Court of Missouri, as in
his three prior appearances, the court rejected Johnson's arguments that the
penalty phase trial court 230 made multiple reversible errors. 231 Several of
Johnson's arguments involved the issue of his alleged mental retardation.232
The court rejected Johnson's argument that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that the burden of proof was upon him. 233 The court first noted that
"[i]t is within the trial court's discretion to decide whether a tendered jury
,234instruction should be submitted." Next, the court examined section
565.030.4(1), which provides that the jury shall render a verdict of life im-
prisonment if it finds by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant is
235
mentally retarded. The court held that the language of the statute "neces-
230. In the opinion, the Supreme Court of Missouri uses the term "trial court"
when referring to Johnson's third penalty phase trial. State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d
144, 150 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). I shall use the term "trial court" as well, but note that
I am referring to the third penalty phase and not his guilt phase trial.
231. Id. at 158. First, Johnson argued that the trial court erred in granting the
State's challenge for cause as to four venirepersons. Id. Johnson asserted that "their
views on the death penalty would not substantially impair their ability to participate in
the deliberative process." Id. The court held that the trial court "did not abuse its
discretion in granting the State's challenges for cause" as to the four jurors. Id. at
160. Next, the court rejected Johnson's argument that the trial court erred in admit-
ting crime scene and autopsy photographs into evidence during the penalty phase
because the photographs were gruesome and inflammatory. Id. at 161-62. The court
found that the penalty phase jurors had no prior opportunity to examine the photo-
graphs. Id. at 161. Also, the court rejected Johnson's argument that three jury in-
structions were given in error because these arguments were not preserved for appeal.
Id. at 163-64. The court held that there was no evidence suggesting that the imposi-
tion of the death sentences was a result of passion or prejudice and that the death
penalties were not disproportionate to those imposed in similar cases. Id. at 164.
232. On appeal, Johnson alleged that the penalty phase court erred in instructing
the jury that Johnson had the burden of proving he was mentally retarded by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Id. at 150. Johnson further alleged that the penalty
phase court erred in not granting "his motions for directed verdict on the issue of [his]
mental retardation." Id. at 151.
233. Id. At the penalty phase, Johnson tendered his own instructions for the jury;
these instructions provided that the state had the burden of proving that Johnson was
not mentally retarded and that the state must prove this fact beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 150. The penalty phase court did not accept Johnson's tendered instruc-
tion because it was not a Missouri Approved Instruction. Id.
234. Id. (quoting State v. Hartman, 224 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007)).
235. Id; see Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2000) ("The trier of fact shall assess
and declare the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation,
parole, or release except by act of the governor .. . [i]f the trier of fact finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded . . . .").
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sarily implies" that the burden is upon the defendant to prove to a jury that he
is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty.236
The court also rejected Johnson's argument that the jury must find that a
defendant is not mentally retarded beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by
a mere preponderance of evidence as prescribed by section 565.030.4(1).237
Johnson contended that the Supreme Court of the United States' decisions in
Atkins238 and Ring 23 supported his argument.24o The court in the instant de-
cision noted that, although in Atkins the Supreme Court held that sentencing a
mentally retarded offender to the death penalty is in contravention of the
Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court did not state who shall bear the bur-
den of proof.241 In lieu of creating a bright line rule, the Supreme Court left it
to the individual states to determine appropriate ways to enforce the constitu-
tional restriction on executing mentally retarded offenders.242 The court in
the instant decision also noted that no state requires the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not mentally retarded and that
twenty-nine states have a procedure similar to Missouri's, in which a defen-
243dant is required to prove mental retardation.
The court in the instant decision distinguished Johnson's case from
Ring.244 The court noted that, in Ring, the Supreme Court held that "if a
'[s]tate makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent
on the finding of a fact, that fact . .. must be found by a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."'245 The court concluded that the holding of Ring does not
apply to the issue of mental retardation because, under section 565.030.4(1), a
finding of mental retardation is not a finding of fact that increases the poten-
246tial range of punishment2. Rather, a finding of mental retardation is merely
a finding that removes the defendant from consideration for the death penal-
ty.247 Thus, the court held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury
236. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 150.
237. Id
238. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
239. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
240. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 151.
241. Id. at 150.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 150 n.3. Twenty-one states have statutes requiring the defendant or the
proponent to prove mental retardation; eight states do not have statutes addressing the
issue, but their courts have held that the defendant is required to demonstrate that he
is mentally retarded; two states have statutes that do not state which party has the
burden of proving that the defendant is mentally retarded; four states do not have any
laws addressing the issue; and the remaining fourteen states do not allow for the death
penalty. Id.
244. Id. at 151.
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that Johnson had the burden of proof in showing that he was mentally re-
tarded by a preponderance of the evidence.248
Finally, the court held that the trial court did not err in overruling John-
son's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of his mental retardation.249
Johnson made his motion at the close of the prosecutor's case, before he had
introduced any evidence.250 Because Johnson had the burden of proving that
he was mentally retarded, Johnson had not established his claim as a matter of
law.251 Despite this, the court treated Johnson's motion for a directed verdict
as a motion for acquittal and discussed the strength of the evidence presented
252by the state. The court stated that, despite a substantial amount of conflict-
ing evidence, there was sufficient evidence from which a juror could have
found that Johnson did not prove by a preponderance of evidence that he suf-
fered from mental retardation.253 The court noted that "of all the experts that
examined Johnson, only Dr. Smith and Dr. Keyes found that he was mentally
retarded."254 Of these two experts, Dr. Smith did not initially find Johnson
mentally retarded when he examined him in 1996 and 1999 but changed his
opinion after reviewing the tests conducted by Dr. Keyes.255 Dr. Keyes him-
self was not qualified to diagnose mental diseases, and the only type of men-
tal defect he was qualified to diagnose was mental retardation.256 Further-
more, Dr. Keyes relied on anecdotal evidence gleaned from Johnson's family
and friends to diagnose Johnson's adaptive behaviors.257 Therefore, the court
found that there was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Johnson
had not proven that he suffered from mental retardation.
Judge Michael A. Wolff filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by
258
Judges Stith and Teitelman. Judge Wolff began by stating that the alloca-
tion of the burden of proving mental retardation was made by the court in the
absence of statutory mandate and without considering constitutional ques-
259tions. Judge Wolff echoed the majority's assessment that the Supreme
Court of the United States in Atkins did not discuss whether the defendant or




252. Id. at 152.
253. Id. at 156.
254. Id. "Evidence was presented that Johnson was evaluated by a psychiatrist
and two psychologists, all of whom determined that [Johnson] was not mentally re-
tarded." Id. at 155. Dr. Smith evaluated Johnson in 1996 and 1999 and both times
found that Johnson was not mentally retarded. Id. Dr. Keyes examined Johnson in
2003. Id. at 152.
255. Id.
256. Id at 156.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 165.
259. Id. at 165-66 (Wolff, J., dissenting).
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the state should bear the burden of proving mental retardation or by what
standard it should be proved.260 Next, Judge Wolff noted that section
565.030.4(1), providing that life imprisonment shall be assessed if the trier of
fact finds by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant is mentally re-
tarded, 26 1 does not specify whether the state or the defendant has the burden
of proof.262
Judge Wolff argued that because of the contradicting evidence presented
by the state and by Johnson, the allocation of the burden of proof is important
in determining the punishment Johnson receives.263 The evidence supported
both a finding that Johnson is mentally retarded and a finding that Johnson is
not mentally retarded,264 and, thus, if the burden of proof had been upon the
state, the jury may have found that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conclusion that Johnson was not mentally retarded.265 Therefore, the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof was a matter of life or death for Johnson.266
Judge Wolff next argued that the majority's position was inconsistent
267
with the Supreme Court's holding in Ring. In Ring, the Court held that,
where a defendant's increased punishment is contingent upon a finding of
268
fact, the fact must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Contrary
to the majority's holding,2 69 Judge Wolff stated that Ring speaks of the state's
burden to prove each fact upon which the defendant's punishment depends
and that the burden should be on the state to prove that he was not mentally
retarded and, thus, eligible for the death penalty.2 70 Judge Wolff stated that
this burden does not require the state to prove lack of mental retardation in
260. Id. at 166.
261. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.030.4(1) (Supp. 2009).
262. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 166 (Wolff, J., dissenting).
263. id at 167.
264. Id. Judge Wolff noted that the defense offered evidence that Johnson scored
63 on an intelligence test when he was a child and that Johnson scored 67 on two
separate IQ tests he took as an adult. Id. An IQ below 70 indicates that a person has
significantly subaverage intelligence. Id. Also, the defense presented evidence that
Johnson was deficient in many adaptive behaviors and that as a child Johnson was in
many special education classes. Id. The prosecution presented evidence that Johnson
received four IQ scores indicating an absence of mental retardation, and the prosecu-
tion's expert witness testified that he believed Johnson was faking mental retardation.
Id. Also, the prosecution presented evidence based on his behavior in prison and
prior to his incarceration that Johnson did not have adaptive deficiencies. Id.
265. Id at 167-68.
266. Id. at 167.
267. Id.
268. Id
269. Id. at 151 (majority opinion). The majority held that a determination that a
defendant is mentally retarded is not a finding of fact that increases the potential
range of punishment under Ring, and, therefore, the state is not required to prove the
defendant's lack of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt. Id
270. Id. at 168 (Wolff, J., dissenting).
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every case, but only in cases in which the defendant introduces evidence that
supports a finding of mental retardation.271 In other words, the evidence of
mental retardation presented by Johnson established a prima facie case of
mental retardation, and it then became the burden of the state to prove that
Johnson was not mentally retarded.272
Judge Wolff also stated that "[w]here there is ambiguity, the rule of len-
ity requires . . . the court to strictly construe a criminal statute against the
,,273
state. Judge Wolf noted that "[u]nder the rule of lenity, criminal statutes
may not be extended by judicial interpretation so as to embrace persons and
acts not specifically and unambiguously brought within their terms."274 Be-
cause, argued Judge Wolff, section 565.030.4(1) does not specify which party
must bear the burden of proving mental retardation, the rule of lenity should
have applied to Johnson's case.275 As articulated by Judge Wolff, under the
rule of lenity, the court may not infer that the law implies something that is
not written in the statute.276 Therefore, according to Judge Wolff, the ambi-
guity in the statute must be construed against the state, and thus the court
should have interpreted the statute as placing the burden of proof upon the
state. 277
Judge Wolff would have held that Johnson was "entitled to a new penal-
ty phase trial in which the state had the burden of proving that Johnson is not
retarded," thereby becoming "subject to the death penalty." 278
V. COMMENT
In the last half century, the Supreme Court of the United States has lim-
ited the usage of the death penalty by declaring certain types of sentencing
procedures unconstitutional and by creating protected classes of individu-
279
als. In Furman, decided in 1972, the Supreme Court nearly held the death
penalty unconstitutional in its entirety.280 In the years after the Furman deci-
sion, the Court clarified its position, holding that both permissive and manda-
tory sentencing procedures were unconstitutional in part because they did
nothing to prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.281 The Court
has held that it is unconstitutional to execute an offender guilty of raping an
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. (citing State v. Hobokin, 768 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Mo. 1989) (en banc)).





279. See supra Part IlIl.A.
280. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
281. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
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adult,282 an offender under the age of eighteen,283 and an offender guilty of
284the rape of a child. The Court also has held that it is unconstitutional to
execute a mentally retarded offender.285
By placing the burden of proving mental retardation upon the defendant,
the majority in the instant decision followed the common trend of the other
286jurisdictions in the United States. In fact, no state places the burden of
287
proving mental retardation on the state. The court's decision positions
Missouri among the states that allocate the burden of proving mental retarda-
tion to the defendant through judicial interpretation.288
However, conformity with other jurisdictions aside, the court's decision
ignored the rule of lenity, which states that an ambiguous criminal statute
should be construed in favor of the defendant. Missouri's death penalty stat-
ute does not expressly provide whether the defendant or the state shall bear
the burden of proof.289 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the General As-
sembly intended for the state to bear the burden, just as it is reasonable to
assume that the General Assembly intended for the defendant to bear the bur-
den. Therefore, there is an ambiguity in the statute, and the rule of lenity
should have been triggered.
In the past ten years alone, the Supreme Court of Missouri cited the rule
of lenity to the benefit of defendants several times. The court has used the
rule of lenity to dispose of cases that might be considered mundane. In
Woods, the court followed the rule of lenity to interpret a statute in favor of a
282. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
283. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
284. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2664 (2008).
285. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
286. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
287. See id.
288. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
289. See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (Supp. 2009) ("The trier shall assess and
declare the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole,
or release except by act of the governor . . . [i]f the trier finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded . . . ."). The language of Mis-
souri's statute is substantially the same as the language of Kansas's and Connecticut's
statutes removing mentally retarded offenders from the death penalty. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(d) (2009) ("If, at the conclusion of a hearing pursuant to this
section, the court determines that the defendant is mentally retarded, the court shall
sentence the defendant as otherwise provided by law, and no sentence of death or life
without the possibility of parole shall be imposed hereunder."); CONN. GEN STAT. §
53a-46a(h) (2002) ("The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant
if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided by
subsection (e), that at the time of the offense . . . the defendant was a person with
mental retardation."). The majority opinion in the instant decision said, "Connecti-
cut's and Kansas's statutes do not state which party has the burden of proving that the
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shoplifter.290 In Salazar, the court cited the rule of lenity in holding that a
defendant did not commit the crime of failing to support his supposed
child. 291 The court has also used the rule of lenity to dispose of cases involv-
ing heinous crimes and unsympathetic defendants. In Beaird, the court fol-
lowed the rule of lenity to interpret an ambiguous statute in favor of a sex
292
offender. In Graham, the court used the rule of lenity to dismiss a case
against a defendant convicted of sodomy.29 3
In the instant decision, the majority opinion did not give a detailed dis-
294
cussion of the interpretation of the statute. Despite the ambiguity of the
statute, the majority stated that the statute "necessarily implies" that the de-
fendant must bear the burden of proof.295 The dissenting opinion was correct
when it noted that under the rule of lenity the court must not infer that the law
implies something that is not expressly provided for in the statute.296 In hold-
ing that the statute "necessarily implies" that the defendant bears the burden
of proof, the majority opinion construed an ambiguous statute against the
defendant in violation of the rule of lenity.
Cases in which the death penalty is a potential punishment should re-
quire the highest level of certainty in our judicial process.297 Historically, the
rule of lenity was created with the intention of protecting defendants from the
death penalty.298 In the instant decision, in which a defendant's life was po-
tentially forfeited, the court ignored the rule. If the rule of lenity is applicable
in all cases except cases in which the defendant may be sentenced to death,
the value of the rule is severely diminished.
Furthermore, the majority's decision did not strictly follow the Supreme
Court's holding in Ring. The majority held that the Supreme Court's holding
290. Woods v. State, 176 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
291. State v. Salazar, 236 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
292. J.S. v. Beaird, 28 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
293. State v. Graham, 204 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Mo. 2006) (en bane).
294. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 150.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 168 (Wolff, J., dissenting).
297. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Death is a unique punishment in the United States. In a society that so strongly
affirms the sanctity of life, not surprisingly the common view is that death is the ulti-
mate sanction."). Universally, it is seen that "those charged with capital offenses are
granted special considerations." Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 28
(1956)). In cases in which the death penalty is the possible penalty, "doubts such as
presented here should be resolved in favor of the accused." Id. at 287 (quoting An-
dres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948)). Whatever process may be due a
defendant facing a fine or imprisonment may not necessarily satisfy the process due a
defendant facing the death penalty. Id. at 287 n.3 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 77 (1957)). "Death is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in
its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable to death
in terms of physical and mental suffering." Id. at 287.
298. Newland, supra note 190, at 197.
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in Ring did not require the jury in the instant case to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was not mentally retarded. 299 The majority stated
that a finding that the defendant is not mentally retarded "is not a finding of
fact that increases the potential range of punishment; it is a finding that re-
moves the defendant from consideration of the death penalty."300 The distinc-
tion between increasing the punishment to the death penalty and decreasing
the punishment from the death penalty is arguably ethereal. Under Missouri's
death penalty statute, the state must prove at least one aggravating factor if it
seeks the penalty of death for an offender.o30  Furthermore, if the mitigating
factors outweigh the aggravating factors, then a life sentence will be assessed
rather than a death sentence.302 So, the practical effect of Missouri's death
penalty statute is that, in the absence of a showing of aggravating factors, a
life sentence will be given to the defendant. Therefore, while a finding that
the defendant is not mentally retarded is not strictly a statutory aggravating
factor, such a finding is necessary for the increased penalty of execution.303
According to the Supreme Court in Ring, "If a State makes an increase
in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact,
that fact - no matter how the State labels it - must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt."30 4 Under Missouri's death penalty statute, the death
penalty is an increased punishment; without a showing of aggravating factors,
the defendant will be given a life sentence. For a defendant, a death sentence
is contingent upon a finding that he is not mentally retarded. Although the
defendant's lack of mental retardation has not been labeled as a statutory
aggravating factor, a finding of a lack of mental retardation nevertheless al-
lows for the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the court in the instant
decision arguably misread Ring and should have held that the jury must find
mental retardation or a lack thereof beyond a reasonable doubt.305
Because the court's holding is consistent with the majority of other ju-
risdictions in the United States, one may be inclined to find that this decision
is of little importance. However, as Judge Wolff noted in his dissent, in
Johnson's case the burden of proof meant the difference between life and
306death. In order to prove his mental retardation, Johnson presented evi-
dence in the form of treating mental health experts, teachers, friends, family,
and the results of intelligence tests he took earlier in life. 307 Still, such evi-
299. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 151.
300. Id.
301. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2000).
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).
305. The Supreme Court of the United States has never had the occasion to ad-
dress whether Ring requires that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant facing the death penalty is not mentally retarded.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss2/8
RETARDATION: WHO BEARS THE BURDEN?
dence was not enough to prove mental retardation by a preponderance of
evidence. In capital cases in the future, an undiagnosed mentally retarded
defendant may be before a sentencing jury. For such a defendant, who may
have slipped through the cracks of the education system, proving mental re-
tardation will be difficult.
The dissenting opinion offers an alternative to the majority's holding
that the defendant must bear the burden of proof. Judge Wolff stated that,
where a defendant's evidence establishes prima facie mental retardation, the
burden should then shift to the state to prove that the defendant is not mental-
ly retarded.308 Such a procedure would be problematic if it were used in Mis-
souri. The result would be that many or perhaps all defendants potentially
subject to the death penalty would assert mental retardation in hopes of re-
ceiving a life sentence. It would be rather simple to offer testimony from
family members of the defendants or to purposefully "fail" an IQ test, thereby
establishing prima facie mental retardation. Thus, the state would be required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not mentally re-
tarded in every capital case. Also, the appeals process for defendants con-
victed of first-degree murder would be even further prolonged - this was
Johnson's fourth time before the court. Of course, perhaps the best way to
prevent such use of state resources would be for the General Assembly to
pass legislation expressly placing the burden upon either the state or the de-
fendant. Although in the future a defendant may successfully challenge a
state death penalty statute before the Supreme Court under Ring, currently it
cannot be said that placing the burden upon the defendant is unconstitution-
al.309 In holding that a defendant asserting that he is mentally retarded must
bear the burden of proof, the court may have been purposefully siding with
judicial economy rather than choosing to abide by judicial precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The defendant Ernest Lee Johnson had been before the Supreme Court
of Missouri three times prior to the instant ruling. In his final appearance
before the court, the court held that the Missouri statute excluding mentally
retarded offenders from the death penalty, which does not expressly state
which party has the burden of proof, "necessarily implies" that the defendant
bears the burden of proving mental retardation. Such a holding is in direct
contravention with Missouri's rule of lenity, which states that an ambiguous
308. Id. at 168.
309. An argument in favor of placing the burden of proof upon the defendant is
strengthened by the fact that no state statute places the burden upon the state to prove
lack of mental retardation. See supra Part IlI.A. Should a defendant challenge a state
statute and the Supreme Court hold that Ring requires states to prove mental retarda-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt, such a holding would have far-reaching effects and
would overturn every state statute governing the imposition of the death penalty
against mentally retarded offenders. See supra Part III.A.
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statute must be construed in favor of the defendant. Also, the court held that
the finding of mental retardation may be made by a showing of mere prepon-
derance of the evidence, rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. In so holding, the court arguably misread the Supreme Court of the
United States' decision in Ring. Under the statute, the state should have had
to prove that the defendant was not mentally retarded; instead, the court held
that the defendant had the burden of proving he was mentally retarded.
The rule of lenity was first created with the goal of ameliorating the
harshness of the death penalty and to guard against the possibility that inno-
cent men and women might face "the ultimate sanction" 310 of death. " Al-
though the majority of states have passed legislation placing the burden of
proving that the defendant is mentally retarded upon the defendant, 312 the
Missouri statute does not expressly place the burden upon the defendant.
While the court followed the common trend among the states, the court failed
to adhere to the rule of lenity and construed an ambiguous statute against the
defendant. In so doing, the court sentenced the defendant, a man who may or
may not have been mentally retarded, to the "ultimate sanction."
JAMES GERARD EFTINK
310. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Death is a unique punishment in the United States. In a society that so strongly
affirms the sanctity of life, not surprisingly the common view is that death is the ulti-
mate sanction.").
311. See Newland, supra note 190, at 199-200.
312. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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